Politico · 2026-11-17 10:00:00

What the EU can learn from Mark Carney on digital sovereignty

What the EU can learn from Mark Carney on digital sovereignty
At Davos earlier this year, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney offered a compelling response to a world increasingly shaped by great-power rivalry. Middle powers need greater strategic autonomy, he argued, but they cannot secure it by retreating behind their borders.

Instead, they need to build their own capabilities while working more closely with like-minded partners. On technology, he reasoned that countries should cooperate so they are not ultimately forced to choose between “hegemons and hyperscalers.”

At the recent EU-Canada Summit, that philosophy began to translate into policy. Canada and the EU launched an “Alliance for the Future” based on closer economic, technological and strategic cooperation. They also concluded negotiations on a Digital Trade Agreement designed to support a “secure, open and trusted digital environment”​ resilient economic relations​,​ and trusted cross-border data flows.

That principle matters not only for Europe’s new relationship with Canada, but for its approach to other trusted partners.

Sovereignty without isolation

Like Canada, Europe has diagnosed its technology problem correctly. It depends too heavily on a handful of providers for the cloud, computing power, digital infrastructure and ​artificial intelligence (​AI​)​ models underpinning its economy and security.

Reducing those dependencies will require Europe to put its money where its mouth is, including by unlocking more diversified private investment. Mario Draghi estimated that the EU needs an additional €750 billion to €800 billion of investment each year until 2030. The European Commission, meanwhile, wants to mobili​z​​​e €200 billion for AI and at least triple Europe’s data cent​er​​​ capacity within five to seven years.

Europe cannot expect investment on an unprecedented scale while narrowing the field of companies able to provide it.

But Europe’s approach risks moving in the opposite direction. ​ ​It could exclude some of the businesses investing most heavily in the continent and building European capabilities, while favo​ring others that remain dependent on non-European technology.

That is the risk confronting policymakers as they shape the Cloud and AI Development Act. The legislation seeks to influence not only how Europe expands and secures its technological capabilities, but also which companies can take part.

Herein lies the core trade-off.​ ​ Europe cannot expect investment on an unprecedented scale while narrowing the field of companies able to provide it. Whether it closes its technology gap will depend partly on its ability to draw on the capital and expertise of experienced, trusted partners.

Look beyond ownership

The debate over digital sovereignty therefore needs to move beyond the simplistic question of ownership or headquarters.

A definition based principally on corporate nationality could exclude trusted companies with decades of investment, infrastructure and employment across Europe. It could also protect nominally European suppliers without necessarily making Europe more secure or resilient.

Effective sovereignty should mean that Europe can keep essential services running during a crisis, protect critical systems and retain a choice of secure, trusted suppliers. Assessments should therefore examine who controls data, encryption, operations, security and continuity.

Corporate nationality is relevant, but it cannot answer these questions on its own. A cloud provider may be EU-owned yet rely on processors, software and security tools developed elsewhere. Another may be headquartered outside the EU but operate European data cent​er​​​s, employ European engineers, place data and encryption keys under European control​,​ and comply with demanding European regulation. Any nationality test alone tells policymakers little about which arrangement provides greater sovereignty.

​​ ​In practice, sovereignty done right depends on who can access critical systems, where operational decisions are taken, whether data and encryption remain protected and, ultimately, whether services continue when normal arrangements fail.

Nationality should carry the greatest weight where a provider is controlled from a country that presents a recognized security threat, or where the relevant jurisdiction has the capacity and record of exploiting technological dependencies. ​​The strictest restrictions are justified where foreign interference could threaten national security, including defense, law enforcement and the most essential public services.

Countries such as Switzerland, Canada​ ​and the UK should not automatically fall into the same category as recognized security threats. Where the security conditions do not apply, nationality-based restrictions risk becoming protectionist rather than protective.

Instead, Europe should apply three tests for trusted partners and domestic firms alike: whether operational control rests in Europe; whether the service can continue during a crisis; and whether the provider makes a substantial, long-term contribution to Europe’s technological capacity.

​​In practice, sovereignty done right depends on who can access critical systems, where operational decisions are taken, whether data and encryption remain protected and, ultimately, whether services continue when normal arrangements fail.

Telecoms is a case in point. Regardless of where they are headquartered, operators must keep essential services running through cyberattacks, power failures and supply-chain disruption while protecting the confidentiality of EU data.

A company’s registered address answers none of those operational questions.

Build with trusted partners

This matters beyond the Cloud and AI Development Act. The approach Europe takes to sovereignty could shape policy toward​ ​telecommunications, satellites, semiconductors and other strategic technologies.

Rules that exclude trusted foreign investors primarily on the basis of nationality risk fragmenting the market and deterring some of the capital and experti​se Europe is trying to attract. They could also encourage reciprocal restrictions on European companies operating abroad.

The better approach is the one Carney has begun to articulate: build domestic capability while deepening cooperation with countries that share your security interests and can contribute technology, infrastructure and investment.

The EU should therefore provide a route for British companies that meet demanding security, control and resilience requirements to receive equivalent treatment as trusted providers.

The EU’s developing relationship with Canada shows that this is possible. Its new Alliance for the Future explicitly combines closer economic integration with technological cooperation, security and resilience, while the Digital Trade Agreement seeks to remove unjustified barriers while maintaining strong safeguards.

If deeper integration with Canada can strengthen European sovereignty, the same principle should apply to other trusted partners that meet equally demanding standards.

The obvious next test is the UK.

Britain sits outside the EU’s institutions but remains closely connected to Europe’s economy, technology sector and security. Infrastructure, investment and supply chains cross the Channel, while the UK and EU face many of the same cyber and geopolitical threats.

​​The EU should therefore provide a route for British companies that meet demanding security, control and resilience requirements to receive equivalent treatment as trusted providers, with reciprocal arrangements for qualifying European companies in the UK.

Strategic autonomy does not require strategic isolation.

The second UK-EU Summit on 20 November provides an opportunity to turn that principle into practice.

Leaders should establish a UK-EU Digital Partnership, covering the mutual recognition of trusted providers, coordinating rules affecting cloud and AI infrastructure, and the removal of unnecessary procurement barriers before they become embedded.

Such a partnership would support both sides’ sovereignty objectives by distinguishing genuine strategic dependencies from relationships that add to their resilience and security.

Europe is right to seek greater control over its technological future. But ​​Carney has identified the crucial distinction:​ ​strategic autonomy does not require strategic isolation.

Canada and the EU have begun to show what trusted partnership can look like. The UK should be next.

Disclaimer

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The political advertising is related to the EU’s Cloud and AI Development Act and the development of EU-UK digital cooperation.

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